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The problem of evaluating a stream emerges from some economic problems
that have the common characteristic “lacking a natural termination date”,
such as the optimization of economic growth with streams (of consumption,
for example) that extend over an infinite future, or the analysis of infinitely
repeated games. The resolution of distributional conflicts among a countably
infinite number of generations or periods is subject to intense debate and
research. We contribute to qualify the approach to this aggregation problem
on the basis of evaluations of the streams using social welfare functions (e.g.,
Addler (2011) provides a comprehensive, philosophically grounded argument
for the use of social welfare functions as a framework for governmental policy
analysis).
In research pertaining to intertemporal welfare aggregation, the funda-
mental Diamond (1965) approach suggests the use of social welfare relations
that are continuous with respect to suitable topologies. A classical result
of this approach reveals that strongly Paretian welfare relations, continuous
in the sup norm, cannot treat all generations equally. We adopt a different
position that we call the Basu-Mitra approach, concerned with the possi-
ble existence of social welfare functions (SWFs) that evaluate the infinite
streams by real numbers. No topological consideration is made in this case.
This line of inquiry is inspired by Basu and Mitra (2003), whose main result
implies that it is possible to dispense of the continuity axiom in Diamond’s
impossibility theorem (see also Crespo et al. (2009)).
The resolution of the conflict among infinite generations depends on the
specific form of the Pareto criterion that accounts for efficiency as well as
the equity-related postulates requested. Another factor that influences the
response is the domain of utilities that each generation can possess and, in
particular, whether that domain is discrete or not. We call this domain the
feasible utilities or sometimes feasible social states. Although many of the
analyses rely on common domains, such as bounded intervals of numbers,
the use of discrete sets of feasible utilities is justified by the recognition that
human perception is not endlessly fine. It is a natural setting if the utilities
have a well-defined smallest unit (as happens with measures of monetary
amounts), or if we focus on payoffs of infinitely repeated finite games.
Following Basu and Mitra (2003), much has been established about SWFs
that verify the Anonymity axiom, as we summarize in our concluding sec-
tion 4. In particular, the structure of the set of utility streams creates the
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incompatibility of that egalitarian property with Weak Pareto (see Alcantud
(2012a)) or Dominance for example. Dubey and Mitra (2011) explore this
issue in depth and prove that the domains of feasible states for which there
are SWFs that verify the Weak Pareto and Anonymity axioms are precisely
the domains that do not contain a set of the order type of the set of positive
and negative integers.
A parallel, similarly exhaustive analysis for other focal equity axioms has
not been performed. The Hammond Equity axiom deserves special atten-
tion, because it is preponderant in literature on inequality-averse distribu-
tions of allocations to both finite and infinite societies (e.g. Hammond (1976);
Asheim and Tungodden (2004b); Mariotti and Veneziani (2009)). With this
study, we aim to specify what can be achieved by using Paretian numerical
assignements that reflect this distributional principle. We also attend to the
role of the set of utility streams in tracing what can be done in that respect,
though we do not endorse any concrete structure for such a set. We are
concerned with two salient domain restrictions, namely [0, 1] and N. Similar
to the analysis of anonymous SWFs, we find a generalized incompatibility
in the case of [0, 1] that vanishes when we turn to the case of N, except for
the strongest version of the Pareto principle. Then we show the applicability
of our analysis by exploring its implications with regard to the interfering
properties of efficient SWFs. Non-interference is an ethical principle that
has been introduced by Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) for the study of fair
allocations to finite societies. The generic idea of liberal non-interference
is that any individual has the right to make society remain passive in all
circumstances that change her or his welfare, provided that the welfare of
no other individual is affected. As Mariotti and Veneziani explain, this idea
does not embody any egalitarian consideration. However, when coupled with
Anonymity and the Pareto axiom, non-interference entails Hammond Equity,
even in its restricted form where ‘change’ means only ‘damage’. As a con-
sequence, a surprising new characterization of the leximin criterion arises,
which can be exported to the infinite setting (e.g., the case of infinitely lived
societies where allocations are made to their generations) by Lombardi and
Veneziani (2009, 2012). Mariotti and Veneziani (2011) and Alcantud (2012b)
provide further implications of Paretian axioms and non-interference for so-
cial welfare criteria. Here we take advantage of our results to prove that if a
mild specification of the Paretian axiom is assumed, then any evaluation of
the infinite utility streams must interfere with the interest of some generation,
in the sense that both under adverse and favorable changes in its endowments
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(the other endowments remaining unchanged) the social comparison changes
against its interests. This reasoning brings to light the tension between re-
sponsiveness to the interest of individual generations and liberal respect to
the interests of individual generations.
This article is organized as follows: We introduce our setting and present
our axioms in section 2, along with some simple relationships among the
requirements that we employ. In section 3, we investigate whether the Ham-
mond Equity postulate is compatible with efficient social welfare functions,
considering the cases of both [0, 1] and N. As an application, we deduce some
interfering properties of SWFs that verify the very mild Restricted Weak
Dominance axiom. Our conclusions and related results are summarized in
section 4.
2 Notation and definitions
Let X denote a subset of RN that represents a domain of utility sequences or
infinite-horizon utility streams. We adopt the usual notation for such utility
streams: x = (x1, ..., xn, .......) ∈ X. By (y)con, we mean the constant se-
quence (y, y, ....), (x, (y)con) holds for (x, y, y, y, ....), and (x1, ..., xk, (y)con) =
(x1, ..., xk, y, y, ....) denotes an eventually constant sequence. We write x > y
if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ..., and x  y if xi > yi for each i = 1, 2, ....
Also, x > y means x > y and x 6= y. We use the notation N∗ = N ∪ {0}.
Furthermore, l∞ denotes the set of bounded real-valued infinite sequences.
A social welfare function (SWF) is a function W : X −→ R.
2.1 The axioms
We present some axioms on SWFs, beginning with two consequentialist equi-
ty axioms. They establish preference for more egalitarian allocations of util-
ities among generations in different senses.
Axiom 1 accounts for an equity principle: When there is a conflict between
two generations, every other generation being as well off, the stream where
the least favoured generation is better off must be weakly preferred.
Axiom 1 (Hammond Equity [HE]). If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj >
yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x).
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Axiom 1 captures a formulation of inequality aversion in line with related
proposals like the (weak) Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (Sakai (2006); Hara
et al. (2008)) or the strong forms of the transfer principle in Fleurbaey and
Michel (2001).
The related Axiom 2 was introduced by Asheim and Tungodden (2004a).
Axiom 2 (Hammond Equity for the Future [HEF]). If x,y ∈ X are
such that x = (x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) (x1 > y1 > y > x) , then
W(y) >W(x) .
This axiom places an ethical restriction on the ranking of streams where
the level of utility is constant from the second period on and the present
generation is better off than the future: If the sacrifice by the present gen-
eration conveys a higher utility for all future generations, then such trade is
weakly preferred. Asheim and Tungodden (2004a) and Asheim et al. (2007),
Section 4.3, explain that it is a very weak equity condition –such that with
certain consistency requirements on the social preferences, the “condition
HEF is much weaker and more compelling than the standard ‘Hammond Eq-
uity’ condition”– that can be endorsed from both egalitarian and utilitarian
points of view.
In the preceding axioms, when W(y) > W(x) replaces W(y) >W(x),
we refer to HE+ and HEF+, respectively. Property HE+ is used by d’Aspremont
and Gevers (1977), who adopt the term extremist equity.
In addition, we intend to account for some kind of efficiency. In this sense
the strongest axiom we deal with is the following:
Axiom 3 (Strong Pareto [SP]). If x,y ∈ X and x > y, then W(x) >
W(y) .
The next efficiency axioms are implied by Strong Pareto:
Axiom 4 (Monotonicity [MON]). If x,y ∈ X and x > y then W(x) >
W(y) .
Axiom 5 (Weak Pareto [WP]). If x,y ∈ X and x  y, then W(x) >
W(y).
Monotonicity is regarded as a necessary condition for efficiency. A relaxed
version of WP is the Restricted Weak Pareto axiom (RWP), that is, the
property that states that if x,y ∈ X are eventually constant sequences and
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x  y, then W(x) > W(y). Other, weaker versions of the Strong Pareto
include the following:
Axiom 6 (Weak Monotonicity [WM]). If x,y ∈ X and x  y, then
W(x) >W(y).
Axiom 7 (Weak Dominance [WD]). If x,y ∈ X, and there is j ∈ N such
that xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then W(x) > W(y).
A relaxed version of WD is Restricted Weak Dominance (RWD), which is
the property that states that if x,y ∈ X are eventually constant sequences
and there is j ∈ N such that xj > yj, and xi = yi for all i 6= j, then
W(x) > W(y). The conjunction of WP and MON is a reasonable efficiency
property for a social evaluation.
Note that SP ⇒ MON ⇒ WM, SP ⇒ WP ⇒ WM, and SP ⇒ WD.
In prior literature, the combination of WP and WD has been referred to as
Partial Pareto, whereas the conjunction of WM and WD has been referred
to as Dominance.
Remark 1 Suppose that W is a SWF on either X = l∞ or X = Y
N with
Y ⊆ R order-dense.
If W verifies WD and HE, then W must verify HE+ too. To prove this
assertion, take x,y ∈ X, such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and
xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k. We generate z ∈ X such that zt = xt when t 6= k,
and yk > zk > xk. Then WD implies W(z) > W(x), and the conclusion
follows because W(y) >W(z) under HE.
Similarly, if W is Weakly Paretian and it verifies HEF, then W must
verify HEF+ too. To prove it, take x,y ∈ X such that x = (x1, (x)con) and
y = (y1, (y)con) with x1 > y1 > y > x . There are z1, z such that y1 >
z1 > y > z > x . Now W(y) > W(z1, (z)con) by WP, and W(z1, (z)con) >
W(x1, (x)con) by HEF.
Finally, the Anonymity axiom is the usual equal treatment of all genera-
tions postulate.
Axiom 8 (Anonymity [AN]). For all x,y ∈ X, if there exist i, j ∈ N
such that xi = yj and xj = yi, and for k ∈ N − {i, j}, xk = yk, then
W(x) = W(y).
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2.2 Relationships and other auxiliary results
We proceed to state some relationships between HE and HEF under efficiency
properties:
Lemma 1 Any HE and Monotonic SWF satisfies HEF. Also, if either X =
l∞ or X = Y
N with Y ⊆ R order-dense, then HE plus WP entail HEF+,
and HE plus WM entail HEF.
Proof:
Asheim et al. (2012), Proposition 3, states a result similar to the first
statement for social welfare relations. Its proof is direct and can be repro-
duced here.
Suppose that W is a SWF on either X = l∞ or X = Y
N with Y ⊆ R
order-dense, and that W agrees with HE and WP (resp., WM). In order
to check that W satisfies HEF+ (resp., HEF), take x,y ∈ X, such that
x = (x1, (x)con) and y = (y1, (y)con) with x1 > y1 > y > x . There are z1, z2
such that y > z1 > z2 > x .
Define z = (z1, z2, x, x, x, ...), such that y  z; by WP (resp., WM) we
obtain W(y) > W(z) (resp., W(y) > W(z)). Because x1 > z1 > z2 >
x = x2 and xi = zi for each i > 2, HE yields W(z) >W(x), and therefore
W(y) > W(x) (resp., W(y) >W(x)). 
Combining MON with reinforcements of HEF or HE is not complicated,
as the next example shows.
Example 1 The Rawlsian criterion WR(x) = inf {xi : i = 1, 2, 3, ....} sa-
tisfies a reinforced version of MON (but not WD), Anonymity, HEF+, and
Hammond Equity.
We end this subsection with a technical result that we use subsequently.
Lemma 2 Suppose that W : Y N −→ R (Y ⊆ R order-dense) satisfies HE
and MON.
(a) If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N and
yt > xt when j 6= t 6= k, then W(y) >W(x) .




Pick z ∈ X such that zt = xt when j 6= t 6= k, zj = yj, zk = yk.
Using MON, we obtain W(y) > W(z). If case (b) holds, then SP entails
W(y) > W(z). In each instance, the conclusion follows because HE yields
W(z) > W(x). 
3 Hammond Equity and efficient Social Wel-
fare Functions
In this section, we show that the solution to the problem of combining the
ethics of the Hammond Equity principle with efficiency under the Basu-
Mitra approach depends on the domain of utility streams. In subsection 3.1,
we show that the issue has been partially elucidated when the domain is
X = [0, 1]N, and we complete the corresponding study. An analysis of the
case where X = Y N with Y = N∗ follows in subsection 3.2. We emphasize
that for virtually unrestricted domains of feasible utilities, the Strong Pareto
axiom is incompatible with HE under the Basu-Mitra approach as detailed
in Theorem 1. Therefore, the negative conclusion in Basu and Mitra (2003),
Theorem 1, remains valid when a consequentialist equity axiom such as HE
replaces the procedural axiom AN.
3.1 The domain restriction X = [0, 1]N
For this subsection, we fix X = [0, 1]N. In this setting, Theorem 1 of Baner-
jee (2006) states that there is no SWF satisfying axioms HEF and WD. From
this result and Lemma 1, we can easily deduce that there is no SWF on [0, 1]N
that verifies HE, WM, and WD. Proposition 1 proves that a stronger incom-
patibility appears, because the Hammond Equity postulate is not compatible
with a Restrictedly Weakly Dominant SWF either.
Proposition 1 There are no SWFs on X = [0, 1]N that verify both HE and
RWD.
Proof:
By way of contradiction, let W : [0, 1]N −→ R be HE and RWD. For each
0 < x < 1
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, we let L(x) := W(2x, x, 0, 0, ....) and R(x) := W(1+x
2
, x, 0, 0, ....),




> y > x > 0 implies I(x) ∩ I(y) = ∅, because
L(y) = W(2y, y, 0, 0, ....) >W(
1 + x
2
, x, 0, 0, ....) = R(x)
by application of HE to 1+x
2
> 2y > y > x. This implication is impossible,
because an uncountable number of different rational numbers are assigned.

As to the question of the possible compatibility between WP and HE, it
has been solved in the negative in Alcantud (2012a).
3.2 The domain restriction X = Y N, Y = {0, 1, 2, ....}
We investigate if it is possible to reconcile any version of Hammond Equity
with WD (or stronger axioms) under the Basu-Mitra perspective and the
assumption X = Y N with Y = {0, 1, 2, ....}.
In Theorem 1, we show that the incompatibility of SP and HE when
X = [0, 1]N persists in the case in which X = Ȳ N and Ȳ has enough elements
as to make the Hammond Equity principle meaningful, even if these elements
are not natural numbers.
Theorem 1 If Ȳ ⊆ R and |Ȳ | > 4, there are no SWFs on X = Ȳ N that
verify both HE and SP.
Proof:
As a preliminary technical step, we need to produce an uncountable col-
lection {Ei}i∈I of infinite proper subsets of N with two properties. First,
for all i, j ∈ I such that i < j, Ei ( Ej and Ej − Ei is infinite. Sec-
ond, there exists q such that q ∈ Ei for each index i ∈ I. To justify that
such collection exists, we take an enumeration of the rational numbers in
(0, 1), namely, Q ∩ (0, 1) = {r1, r2, ....}, and then we set I = (r1, 1) and
E(i) = {n ∈ N : rn < i} for each i ∈ I so that q = r1 ∈ E(i) for each i ∈ I.
Now we proceed by contradiction. Assume that W is a SWF on X
that verifies HE and SP. To simplify the notation, we assume without loss
of generality that {0, 1, 2, 3} ⊆ Ȳ . Define the following two utility streams
associated with each i ∈ I:
r(i)p =

1 if p ∈ Ei, p 6= q





1 if p ∈ Ei, p 6= q
2 if p = q
0 otherwise
For each i ∈ I, the open interval (W(l(i)), W(r(i))) is not empty by SP, so it
contains a rational number. We intend to check that the intervals associated
with different indices i, j ∈ I are disjoint, that is, that j < i ⇒ W(l(i)) >
W(r(j)). This scenario produces the desired contradiction, because an un-
countable number of distinct rational numbers is obtained.
Fix k ∈ Ei−Ej. We claim that Lemma 2 (b) applies to coordinates q and k
of l(i) and r(j). Observe that 3 = r(j)q > 2 = l(i)q > 1 = l(i)k > 0 = r(j)k.
Also, when q 6= p 6= k, we have: l(i)p = r(j)p if either p ∈ Ei ∩ Ej or
p /∈ Ei ∪ Ej, and l(i)p = 1 > 0 = r(j)p for every p ∈ Ei, p /∈ Ej (recall that
there are an infinite number of elements in Ei−Ej). This ends the argument.

Despite this negative result, Theorem 2 assures that the conjunction of
WP and WD can be combined with HE+ even in the presence of Anonymity.
We present this result for the sake of completeness, but it has a limited
theoretical interest, because our construction must contradict MON: The
combination of WD and MON entails SP, which is incompatible with AN.
To prove Theorem 2, we provide the following auxiliary result:





(n = 0, 1, 2, ...) is strictly in-
creasing in n and satisfies: x > y2 > y1 > z ⇒ ν(y1)− ν(z) > ν(x)− ν(y2).
Proof:






































Because y2 > z + 1, the conclusion follows. 
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Theorem 2 If Y = {0, 1, 2, ....}, there are SWFs on X = Y N that satisfy
HE+, Anonymity, WP, and WD.
Proof:
We closely follow Mitra and Basu’s (2007) proof that there are Anony-
mous SWFs on X = Y N satisfying WP and WD. 1 The binary relation on
X given by x ∼ y, if and only if xi = yi eventually is an equivalence relation.
The equivalence class of x is denoted by [x]∼. We select an element g([x]∼)
from each equivalence class [x]∼ in the quotient set
X
∼ . For simplicity, we
write gx = g([x]∼), and as usual, g
x = (gx1 , g
x
2 , ...). Thus when x,y satisfy
xi = yi eventually we determine that g
x = gy.
Denote AN(x) = ν(x1)+ ....+ν(xN)−(ν(gx1 )+ ...+ν(gxN)) for each N ∈ N
and x ∈ X, and consider the function h(x) = limN→∞(AN(x)), which is well
defined because AN(x) is eventually constant (for any fixed x). Then h is
clearly Anonymous and Weakly Dominant. We next prove that h satisfies
HE+.
If x,y ∈ X are such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and
xt = yt when j 6= t 6= k, our construction entails gx = gy. Therefore there is
an index N0 such that AN(y) − AN(x) = ν(yj) − ν(xj) + ν(yk) − ν(xk) for
each N > N0. Now Lemma 3 yields AN(y)− AN(x) > 0 whenever N > N0
and thus h(y) > h(x) .








It is clear that LAH is Anonymous because so is h. By mimicking Mitra and











Thus whenever y x, the fact that min{y1, y2, ...} > min{x1, x2, ...}+1
implies LAH(y) > LAH(x). With the knowledge that h(x) is WD, we can
easily demonstrate that LAH is WD. To prove that LAH is HE
+, we select
x,y ∈ X such that xj > yj > yk > xk for some j, k ∈ N, and xt = yt when
j 6= t 6= k. Now LAH(y) > LAH(x) can be enforced through two inequalities:
1Their construction fulfils HEF too.
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h(y) > h(x), as we proved previously, such that H(h(y)) > H(h(x)), because
H is strictly increasing; and min{y1, y2, ...} > min{x1, x2, ...}. 
3.3 Application when X = [0, 1]N: Interfering proper-
ties of RWD evaluations
In analyzing the criteria for comparing allocations to a finite society, Ham-
mond (1976) characterized the leximin ordering on the basis of AN, SP, and
HE. Mariotti and Veneziani (2009) have proven that under AN and SP, HE
is equivalent to a liberal non-interference property called the Harm Princi-
ple (HP). Thus an alternative characterization of the leximin social ranking
can be stated in terms of AN, SP, and HP. Mariotti and Veneziani (2009)
emphasize that this fact seems fairly surprising, considering that the HP
does not embody any egalitarian consideration, whereas Hammond Equity
is a strongly egalitarian property. Extensions of their analysis to the cases
of the leximax criterion and infinitely lived societies appear in Mariotti and
Veneziani (2011) and Lombardi and Veneziani (2009, 2012). They appeal
to the appropriate versions of the Harm Principle and its counterpart, the
Individual Benefit Principle (IBP): 2
Axiom HP. Suppose x,y ∈ X = [0, 1]N are eventually coincident and
x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ ∈ X such that for some i ∈ N, j 6= i
implies x′j = xj and y
′
j = yj. If x
′
i < xi and y
′






Axiom IBP. Suppose x,y ∈ X = [0, 1]N are eventually coincident and
x  y. Consider two streams x′,y′ ∈ X such that for some i ∈ N, j 6= i
implies x′j = xj and y
′
j = yj. If x
′
i > xi and y
′






In particular, preference continuities support characterizations of infinite
extensions of the leximin criterion, on the basis of both HE (e.g. Asheim and
Tungodden (2004b)) and adapted versions of HP. 3 Nevertheless, Lombardi
2For the respective versions when X = [0, 1]n, n ∈ N, we just need to suppress the
unnecessary restriction to eventually coincident streams.
3Asheim and Zuber (2011) characterize strongly anonymous infinite extensions of the
leximin criterion in terms of restricted continuity in the topological sense. Their use of the
product topology is justified by means of prioritarianism for the worse-off, thus avoiding
the appeal to HE too.
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and Veneziani (2012), Theorem 3, show that in the evaluation of infinitely
long streams by orderings, AN, SP, and preference continuity properties are
incompatible with full non-interference (i.e., with the conjunction of HP and
IBP). Restricting their analysis to a finite economy, Mariotti and Veneziani
(2011) prove that a fully liberal non-interfering view of society leads to a
dictatorship when WP is requested. However, Alcantud (2012b) proves that
extending the horizon to infinity leads to a striking disappearance of this
undesirable implication.
In this subsection, we take advantage of the techniques we have developed
to prove a negative result that aligns with that Mariotti and Veneziani (2011)
have demonstrated: RWD evaluations of X = [0, 1]N must interfere with the
interest of particular generations, in the sense that both HP and IBP are
contradicted. Consider the following Lemma: 4
Lemma 4 (F. Maniquet) Let < be a SWO on X = [0, 1]N. If < verifies
AN and HP, then < verifies HE.
From Proposition 1 (no SWF on X verifies RWD and HE) and Lemma 4,
we obtain a direct proof that RWD, AN, and HP are incompatible for SWFs;
a twin argument proves the dual assertion for IBP. We now proceed to prove
that even if we dispense with AN, a SWF that verifies RWD must contradict
both HP and IBP.
Proposition 2 There is no SWF on X = [0, 1]N that verifies HP (resp.,
IBP) and RWD.
Proof:
We prove the statement for HP and leave the dual proof for IBP to the
reader.5





a < b < c and W(a, c, 0con) < W(b, b, 0con).




) , we let l(x) = W(x
2
, x, 0con)
and r(x) = W(x, x, 0con). The open interval i(x) = (l(x), r(x)) is nontrivial




) , we have 1
8





4This result by F. Maniquet was communicated to the authors by R. Veneziani.
5We note that the IBP case is simpler. First, recall that under the RWD axiom, HE is
contradicted (cf., Proposition 1). Second, this information can similarly prove that IBP is
contradicted too, as in Step 2 of our proof.
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b = x < c = y < 1
2









we would associate a different rational number.
Step 2. Take W on X, verifying RWD and HP. Then, by Step 1, there




), such that a < b < c and W(a, c, 0con) < W(b, b, 0con).
We next obtain a contradiction.
For each x ∈ [0, 1
8
] , let L(x) = W(x, b, 0con), and R(x) = W(x, c, 0con).
The open interval I(x) = (L(x), R(x)) is nontrivial, due to RWD. Thus we
can claim R(x) < L(y) if 0 6 x < y 6 1
8
. Observe that W(b, b, 0con) >
W(a, c, 0con), b >
1
8
> y, a > 1
8
> y > x, and thus HP applies to prove the
claim. But this is impossible, because with each x ∈ [0, 1
8
], we associate a
different rational number. 
4 Summary of results, conclusions, and rela-
tion to prior literature
We have produced new arguments to contribute to a persistent debate: In
combining equity and efficiency in the evaluation of infinite utility streams by
social welfare functions, what properties can be guaranteed? Furthermore,
what influence does the choice of the set of feasible utilities have? We con-
clude that if we are interested in imposing the HE spirit, then the existence
of a non-degenerate interval as potential social states obliges at least RWD
efficiency to incompatibility, whereas the appeal to N∗ does not (and the
problem of existence depends upon the precise version of the Pareto axiom).
In particular, and for virtually unrestricted domains of feasible utilities, if we
use evaluations of the streams that verify HE, then only restricted versions
of Paretianity can be attained.
The following tables summarize results that served to motivate our dis-
cussion, and they also support comparisons of the differences in approaches
when we vary the feasible utilities. Table 1 refers to the analysis of SWFs
that verify AN, and Table 2 details the analysis under HE.
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Table 1. Summary of results for domains of utility streams Y N under AN
Y = N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Non-existence ? Non-existence
WP + WD Existence † Non-existence
WM + WD Existence Non-existence 
WD Existence Existence ‡
Statement ? is proven in Basu and Mitra (2003) when |Y | > 1. All †, ‡
and  appear in Basu and Mitra (2007). We emphasize that the construction
proving ‡ holds in X = l∞ and fulfils HEF. The other statements in the table
derive from  and †.
When Y = N∗, the Rawlsian criterion is MON, WP, HE, and AN, but
Basu and Mitra (2007) prove that WP and AN are incompatible when Y =
[0, 1]. Dubey and Mitra (2011) prove that a social welfare function satisfying
the Anonymity and Weak Pareto Axioms exists only in those domains that
do not contain any set of the order type of the set of positive and negative
integers.
Table 2. Summary of results for domains of utility streams Y N under HE
Y = N∗ Y = [0, 1]
SP Non-existence ? Non-existence
WP Existence with MON and AN § Non-existence ‡
WP + WD Existence with AN  Non-existence
RWD Existence with AN Non-existence †
Proposition 1 conveys statement †. Case ‡ is proven in Alcantud (2011a).
The Rawlsian criterion proves that § holds. Case ? is proven by Theorem 1,
which produces non-existence as long as Y has enough elements as to make
the equity axiom meaningful. Case  holds by Theorem 2, which ensures
HE+. The other statements in the table derive from , †, and ‡.
Proposition 1 generalizes Sakamoto (2011), Proposition 1, which states
that for SWFs on X = [0, 1]N, a property called Altruistic Equity-2 (or AE-
2) and WD are incompatible. The reason is that AE-2 plus WD implies the
property called Strong Equity Principle, which is equivalent to HE under
WD.
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We can also report on the main results that arise when SWFs under the
HEF axiom are investigated. For domains of utility streams of the form
[0, 1]N, Banerjee (2006) proves that a property weaker than WD must be
contradicted. Turning to the case Y N with Y = N∗, Alcantud and Garćıa-
Sanz (2010), in their Proposition 1, prove that SP can be guaranteed by an
explicit construction, and their Theorem 1 proves that PP can be guaranteed
by an anonymous construction, as well as that the dictatorship by the second
(or third, fourth, ... ) generations verifies MON, WP, and HEF.
We stress that the problem of the existence of criteria with certain prop-
erties differs from the problem of explicitly describing one such criterion. The
need for such a distinction is emphasized by recent contributions, including
Zame (2007), Theorem 4′, Lauwers (2010), and Dubey (2011), who respond
to a conjecture by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) about the constructibility of
fair evaluations of infinite utility streams. In the words of Jacques Hadamard,
these contributions demand that the debate distinguish “between what is de-
termined and what can be described.” 6
6From a letter to E. Borel written in 1905 (Ewald (1996), pages 1084-1085).
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